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SWIFT II DRC

ANNUAL REPORT

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO INITIATIVE

SNYERGIE D'EDUCATION ET D'APPUI A' LA TRANSITION (SE*CA)



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Background

After the fall of the Mobutu regime in the 1990s, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), formerly known as Zaire, experienced a period of economic decline and social dislocation. The Great Lakes crisis and the Rwandan genocide exacerbated these problems. These events caused a massive outflow of refugees, many of whom were Interhamwe. The refugees retreated into the eastern regions of the Congo along the Rwandan and Burundi borders and led the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian armies to occupy the DRC. The DRC's immense wealth ultimately resulted in poverty and insecurity because foreign armies secured access to the country's vast natural resources.

The DRC continues to struggle to recover from the devastating effects of six years of conflict and decline that have destabilized central Africa and caused immense suffering to the country's civilian population. The war that commenced in August 1998 and quickly engulfed the country has resulted in extreme violence, mass population displacements, widespread rape, and a collapse of social, political, and economic services. The outcome has been a humanitarian disaster unmatched by any other in recent decades. From the beginning of the war to the end of April 2004, approximately 3.8 million people have died because of the crisis, and 31,000 people continue to die each month due to the conflict¹. The study found that insecurity increased the number of deaths from both violent and non-violent causes. In conflict-prone areas such as Ituri District and Eastern Congo generally, where insecurity often impedes access to humanitarian aid, the greatest number of deaths have resulted because of preventable diseases and food shortages following the collapse of the country's infrastructure, health systems, and economy. Estimates show that only two percent of the 3.8 million deaths were due to war-related injuries. The appalling death toll is largely a problem of inadequate access to aid.

In this reporting period (from February 23, 2004 to February 23, 2005), the Kinshasa transitional government has witnessed positive and negative trends in implementing its transitional program. Positive events have been the start of military unification through the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process². Several military men from different military groups have undergone or are receiving military training in centers in North Kivu, Ituri, and Kindu, among others. Soldiers, who have finished their training, have been absorbed in the Integrated Congolese army known as *Force armées congolaises* (FARDC) and then deployed. Serious questions remain, however, regarding the ability of the FARDC to integrate the large number of combatants scheduled to become part of the national army.

In Ituri, the most unstable region of the country³, the process of disarming ex-combatants started in late September. Six transit centers were opened and 3,300 ex-combatants were disarmed, demobilized, and reintegrated into the national army. According to the United Nations Development Programme

¹ This data is based on an IRC report published in mid-December 2004.

² The process has stalled, especially in Ituri District, where SE*CA is present, and has even been reversed, with demobilized combatants returning to militia groups because of intimidation and fear of an uncertain future as they become reintegrated into their communities.

³See "Situation in Ituri" on page 38.

(UNDP) in Bunia, the exercise sought to disarm and reintegrate 5,000 combatants, 6,000 of whom are children. More recently, however, the militias have intensified their activities, in part because of the perceived passivity of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) but also because of apprehension among many militia members about their future in the present security and economic environment.

While the major challenge facing populations in the Kisangani zone is not insecurity, in Maniema, people still live in fear of armed groups and face intimidation. In Ituri, the problem is the lack of central authority, and the proliferation of armed groups who are holding their own populations hostage. In central Ituri, there has been a strong renewal of inter-ethnic rivalry especially in Djugu District.

At the national level, the election process is advancing, although slowly. Progress is being made due to pressure ‘from the street’ and impatience throughout the country to complete the transition process and to hold elections. Some institutions have made significant progress in moving towards democratic governance. For example, the Independent Electoral Commission has been commissioned and parliament has enacted the electoral law and proposed the elections timetable. The population is eagerly awaiting the June deadline, even though no official date has been set. Even with these advances, the public still feels that the process is moving too slowly; this perception may jeopardize the transition.

The security situation, although improved, is still questionable in some parts of Eastern DRC, particularly in the Ituri district of Orientale province, as described above. In late 2004, for example, UN troops closed a militia camp near a transit center in Mahagi due to allegations that it was unsafe for demobilized soldiers. Some young combatants who had decided to demobilize through the formal process had received death threats, some soldiers and civilians had been killed, and taxes were being levied illegally. These allegations have thrown the entire district into a state of heightened insecurity, with consequences for pursuing activities for the Synergie d’éducation et d’appui à la transition (SE*CA) in certain areas, notably in the Zombe area, 20 km southeast of Bunia. It is likely that the militia camp will be relocated and there will be further delays, particularly in implementing YES (Youth Education and Skills) training.

Other negative events that put the transition process at risk included the outbreak of pneumonic plague in Buta, on the northern axis from Kisangani in Orientale Province.

Security threats in North Kivu have led some NGOs to suspend their activities, following the looting of their installations by militiamen. One of these activities was a project to rehabilitate a road between Masisi and Walikale to help vulnerable people in the Masisi-Walikale areas. Recently, the Ngiti militia group in southern Ituri attacked and wounded four NGO workers who were traveling in a vehicle. The increased risk of employees from international NGO being attacked has affected these groups’ ability to deliver assistance to local populations and has contributed to a general sense that MONUC and the national government is powerless in the FARDC to reduce these acts of violence.

Within the transitional government itself, there have been accusations and counter accusations. In August last year, the RCD party suspended its participation in the transitional government and accused it of failing to establish proper guidelines for integrating former rebels into the new national army. The MLC

party leader, who blamed the transitional government for not adhering to the transition calendar, echoed the same sentiments early this year.

The DRC has witnessed strikes and demonstrations among civil servants, church groups, and students all demanding information and acceleration of the transition process and payment of their salaries. In February 2004, a month-long strike by doctors, nurses, and other medical personnel in government hospitals demanding better pay left 1,360 dead in the referral hospital in Kinshasa. There were no statistics for deaths at other medical facilities in the country. Teachers have also been striking to demand payment of their salaries. Those in military service have also been complaining about lack of payment or low and delayed salaries. Students and the public have demonstrated to press the government to adhere to and speed the transition process. When the Independent Electoral Commission reported that the election date could be extended to allow for adequate preparations, there was widespread unrest in the country. Various groups have blamed the transition government for delaying the process, continuing to loot national resources, and solidifying their political power.

In December 2004, with new battlefronts opening up and tens of thousands of civilians fleeing their homes, concern mounted among international bodies that the DRC was heading for a major war, or as the Congolese say, the third Congolese war. Fighting had intensified in North Kivu in December between troops of the Congolese army who had arrived from the capital, Kinshasa, and troops in the 8th Military Region who were believed to have been members of the former rebel movement, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) based in Goma. The UN created a 10-km buffer zone between Kanyabayonga and Lubero to protect and permit the humanitarian community to reach thousands of displaced civilians in the area. The clash caused 100,000 people to flee their homes, according to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the growing instability threatened the DRC's fragile political transition. This led to the transfer of the military commander of the 8th Military Region North Kivu Province to Kasai-Orientale.

Against this backdrop of continued unrest, insecurity, and general economic decay, the challenges facing the country are daunting. The international community is largely in support of the process. The SE*CA project grew out of the recognition that for political transition in the DRC to succeed a minimum of social peace and stability was necessary.

It will take time for the dislocation and suffering visited upon the country's population, particularly in eastern DRC, which has erupted in the Great Lakes crisis, to end. The populations of the Kivus, Orientale, and Maniema provinces were particularly affected by the disintegration of the state apparatus, the violence generated by Congolese warring factions, and the demands of foreign armies. Road networks, communications facilities, and social infrastructures fell into ruin, and the Congolese people, after years of corruption and neglect, have fended largely for themselves. In addition, because of the unreliability of the Congolese army and the arms embargo in effect since the Mobutu years, the country could not defend itself against well-armed and trained armies in Rwanda and Uganda.

In this context of social decay, war, dislocation, and economic decline, negotiations to bring order and peace to the country are ongoing and seek to incorporate the various political and military factions. One

of the difficulties of the transition process is that the present national government is composed of former warring factions. Some of these factions have been supported by external forces, and, in the case of the RCD-Goma, by a de-facto occupation of parts of Eastern DRC by the Rwandan army. It is unclear whether all parties who signed the transition agreements will cooperate until the national elections create a government with greater legitimacy than the current one. For the transition to succeed, a careful balancing act is required that will enable signatories to withdraw but allow the will of the people to emerge through fair and transparent elections throughout the country.

The 2002 peace accords fueled hope that the years of slaughter, displacement, sexual violence and desperation had ended. The subsequent deployment of international peacekeeping troops coincided with the withdrawal of foreign forces, leading to increased stability and humanitarian access and a dramatic decline in insecurity. A new transitional government was established, tasked with reunifying the country. The presence of internal militia groups and neighboring countries' interests in eastern DRC, however, has created instability in parts of the country. Uganda and Rwanda had deployed thousands of troops in the DRC in the 1990s initially to protect their borders from attacks by dissidents who were operating from eastern Congo, but the armies of both countries fought alongside Congolese rebels who wanted to overthrow the DRC President, Laurent Desire Kabila.

Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi, have invaded the DRC twice, sparking a war that involved six African nations. In all invasions, the neighboring countries have blamed DRC's militia as the obstacle to regional peace. The process by which disarmament is handled in the Great Lake region will contribute to the return of confidence in the region, better living and working conditions, and foster better cooperation in defense, security, and commerce.

In 2003 and 2004, the DRC was dangerously close to sliding back into full-scale war. Political progress had stalled, a series of violent incidents had threatened to undermine the peace process and destabilize the region. Rwanda had threatened to attack Hutu extremists in the DRC, there had been explosive violence in Bukavu in June 2004 and the brutal August massacre of nearly 160 Congolese Tutsi refugees at a camp in Burundi⁴. These events, coupled with regular student and civilian demonstrations and the endless boycotts and suspension of membership in the transitional government by the RCD, made the situation particularly bleak.

Urgent action is needed to restore stability, strengthen the peace process, and address the underlying causes of conflict. Increasing stability in the war torn communities is the most effective way to begin reconstruction, recovery, reintegration and reconciliation. SE*CA is working both in Ituri and in Maniema to support efforts by the international community and the national government to stabilize communities and influence authorities at the provincial and national level. It is widely accepted that once stability is established, farmers will return to their fields, markets will reopen, social services will become functional, and a vibrant social, economic, and political atmosphere will begin in the DRC. While the situation in Maniema province is presently less volatile than in Ituri, there is a great need to rebuild

⁴ It is now recognized that these crimes were perpetrated by opponents of the current régime in Burundi rather than by the Congolese.

confidence, mutual trust, aid the transition and the ensuing elections, and contribute to economic development.

B. Project Preparation

B1. Start-up

Prior to the launch of program activities, Chemonics mobilized a start-up team to address the myriad administrative, bureaucratic, and logistical details to properly establish the implementation team. This phase also meant mobilizing a home-office project management unit to support the “Go Team” in the DRC and ensure that proper project management and tracking systems were in place in the Home Office. Activities included establishing offices in Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Bunia and involved registering the program in the country, renting office space and expatriate housing, finalizing a staffing plan, installing equipment, establishing administrative and financial systems, evaluating security in addition to a plethora of other tasks.

Additionally, the Go Team, Design Team, and members of the Implementation Team met with OTI—Kinshasa and Washington, D.C.—in Kinshasa for three days to develop strategy, a six-month work plan, and teambuilding, all of which proved essential in harmonizing goals and objectives for the program.

B2. Design Document

Development of the design document drew on the work of two design teams who, in the beginning of March 2004, met in Kinshasa with several UN agencies, national authorities, international NGOs, and other organizations. The two teams then traveled to the Eastern part of the DRC. Additional meetings were held with UN agencies and national and international organizations.

Team one carried out assessments in Kisangani and the surrounding region, including Bafwasende, Lubutu, and Punia. Team two did assessments in Bunia and Kindu regions.

The two teams met in Kinshasa for joint meetings and to edit the draft document. This is an evolving document that has gone through various edits and modifications resulting in recommendations from OTI and Chemonics staff.

The design document discussed the situation in the DRC and its various conflicts, the DDR process, thematic groups, and the OTI/CFR Program and the program locations, including Kisangani, Bunia, Kindu, and other areas. The document was originally drafted in February 2004. As the program moved into its operational phase, and approached the end of the first cycle of YES training at the end of 2004, the team considered other areas. One that bears mention is Maniema, one of the most neglected provinces of the country, which was originally excluded from the project. However, the team finally decided to open a small office in Kindu and preparations were undertaken in August and September to give SE*CA minimum operational capacity. Maniema harbors many of the populations that the program is designed to help: war affected youth, women and girls who are victims of sexual violence. It

is one of the most remote provinces in the DRC by virtue of its distance from large population centers, its geographical isolation, and the fragile state of its communications and transportation infrastructures. In Maniema, the focus has been mostly on YES training, with a series of smaller community projects funded through the SE*CA Grants mechanism in support of communities hosting these trainings. Maniema is also a province vulnerable to various forms of harassment by militias and other armed groups, and, since the mid-nineties, has been vulnerable to troops from neighboring countries as one of the major transit routes between Bukavu / Goma and Kisangani passes through the northwestern portion of the province.

From Kisangani, which is more stable than Ituri province, it was decided that the three teams of master trainers, who were based in Kisangani, would continue working in the second phase of training activities, on work completed in the first cycle. The second phase of training focused on parts of DRC further north from Kisangani on the Buta axis, towards Bafwasende as far as Isiru west and northwest of Kisangani, and southward towards Ubundu. Since the two teams of master trainers in Maniema will now be based in Punia in the northern reaches of the province, they will move towards each other, allowing SE*CA to be present from Kindu northward all the way to Kisangani

Activities projected in the second cycle in Ituri will focus on a zone around Buta, some 300 km. to the north of Bunia, but also in communities closer to Bunia that are very isolated. It is important to note that in Ituri District, the state of generalized insecurity may jeopardize SE*CA's ability to adhere to the projected zones of operation, and destabilize ongoing activities, such as YES trainings and related activities in project zones.

I. PROGRAM STRATEGY

A. Youth Education and Skills (YES) Training

Youth in the SE*CA program are defined as individuals between the ages of 18 and 30 (in extreme cases, 16 to 35 years of age) who are affected by the prolonged conflict in DRC.

War-affected youth are youth who, through loss of opportunities due to the conflicts, are out of school, or have never been to school, are disaffected, unemployed, destitute or directionless, and potentially violent. They may have left their communities to fight in wars or they may have stayed. They may also be returnees, including ex-combatants, who wish to be reintegrated into their communities.

The education and life skills training is delivered by master trainers, who are initially trained by the training officer. They train local facilitators based in communities who in turn train the youth for about six months.

The work of creating the YES training program was already underway with the initial design of the program. An earlier USAID civic training program called the Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) had been implemented in Sierra Leone and served as a model for the present program. One consultant and the program's training officer began adapting the YRTEP program to the DRC context. Several master trainers were recruited and joined the team. The project's 14 master trainers participated in adapting and translating of the curriculum from YRTEP. The modules are adapted to allow illiterate people to participate; one of SE*CA's learning facilitator is illiterate.

The original YES program consisted of seven modules, and was to be used in classes of 20 to more than 30 participants⁵ by learning facilitators, who were chosen by the communities. A full training cycle, administered at a rate of three days every week for three hours per group of participants, will take about six months to deliver. This figure may vary depending on local conditions, dispersal of populations, ease or relative difficulty of access, and distance from home base for the master trainers charged with monitoring all training activities in their zones. Two full cycles of training, now consisting of five, 'recombined' modules⁶ will be delivered during the life of the SE*CA project, with each learning facilitator team, consisting of two people, running two trainings in tandem per cycle. Once a community agrees to participate in the YES training, the program will set up activities in that community to complete all modules of training.

The SE*CA program's successful training approach with communities, as shown by the high levels of attendance and the sustained interest in the contents of the various modules, has gained considerable attention from other agencies and humanitarian organizations in the project areas. This combined approach of dispensing training and community projects is now being considered or emulated by other groups. Community involvement, through donated labor and supply of locally available materials, in


⁵ Classes have generally significantly surpassed the original planned figures, causing some financial challenges in supplying participants with notepads and pencils or pens.

⁶For example, some of the five modules incorporate elements of modules that are no longer being taught (e.g. income-generating activities are now sometimes included in the module on agriculture)

exchange for support through training and in-kind grants for projects of social utility, is required for success. This community involvement and SE*CA's ability to convey to local populations that progress and change can be a direct result of their efforts is one of the positive results of the SE*CA project. A more formal evaluation will give an even better measure of the impact of the trainings and related activities,

The YES program is contributing to a stable and more secure environment for war-torn communities in Eastern DRC by supporting the reintegration process between war-affected youths and their host communities while at the same time reinforcing community, regional and national awareness to increase community participation in the transition process. To achieve this, the YES training employs a curriculum that emphasizes basic life skills for succeeding in a civil society and processes of reconciliation for those enmeshed in war and violence.

Exhibit 1. SE*CA Organization Chart



B. Community Focused Reintegration Grants

In the first cycle of YES training and related activities, program activities are taking place in three areas where communities have had various experiences of suffering and hardship related to war and the collapse of the state. Given the differing security situations, notably the unstable and deteriorating security situation in Ituri District, certain activities that were considered in more stable areas on the road axes around Kisangani could not be undertaken in many parts of Ituri. In Ituri, it was clear that modules needed to focus more on reconciliation and traditional values, with TAP activities that conveyed the need for greater understanding among various groups. The difficulty of working in Ituri is also a function of the difficult launch of DRC⁷ activities, as militia groups are reluctant to exchange their weapons and return to their communities to face an uncertain future. Given the difficulty of access and logistical problems working in remote areas of Maniema Province, community projects tend to be smaller in nature. In Kisangani, greater emphasis was placed, from the start, on economic activities, allowing better access between communities⁸.

The design teams chose the program sites for the first round of community activities, which were centered largely in the zones where YES training was to be delivered. When the project was first designed, Bukavu was mentioned as one of the possible sites for an office in the SE*CA program. In March 2004, the security situation in South Kivu was already unstable, if not deteriorating, and Kisangani was selected as a more stable base from which SE*CA could advance its various initiatives.

As mentioned above, SE*CA's approach emphasizes active community participation in realizing various community projects. These projects were selected because of their potential as rallying points for community integration and their ability to offer stability to dislocated communities. This stability can happen through economic initiatives, such as financing oil presses or community-owned milling equipment, and, more recently, micro-credit schemes for populations within the Kisangani basin. There have also been a number of rehabilitation projects, for community infrastructures such as markets, electrical utilities, roads, and railway lines. Besides the economic utility of such projects, they are also selected because they can help bring people together and create a renewed sense of community and national belonging.

As the project developed, different ways were explored to ensure that each of the three major elements of SE*CA; community projects, YES training and media (now TAP⁹), reinforced each other to increase impact. Each of these three elements cannot be viewed in isolation but should be viewed more for their contributions to the program's overall synergy and impact as the whole is greater than the individual parts. For example, while the training modules adapted for each operational zone were useful, the impact in terms of community revitalization was greater if community projects required the inclusion of a community contribution such as the donation of labor and locally available resources. The community projects allowed different groups within these communities to engage in consensus building by discussing ways to agree on and achieve common goals, to instill a sense of self-reliance, and to create space to

⁷ Demobilization and Community Reinsertion

⁸ For example, with the railroad rehabilitation project in which SE*CA was one of the major contributors through USAID funding.

⁹ Transition Awareness Participation

trust building which are all necessary ingredients to realize these projects¹⁰. In addition, as the modules and the community projects neared completion, regional TAP activities began to amplify the impact of the successes of the project and to leverage activities through a series of awareness-raising activities with local groups and media outlets.

The city of Kisangani, the provincial capital of the Orientale province, is the project's principal operational base in Eastern DRC. The city was selected for its strategic location, easy access from Kinshasa by regular MONUC flights, and because it provides access to large areas in eastern Congo where the project is being implemented. Security is relatively good, and the city has an adequate airport, which is only 20 km. from the city center. As for war history, the city has seen separate foreign troops fighting on three occasions but it has not seen any fighting between different Congolese troops. River traffic allows access to goods from Kinshasa during the long rainy season, although the low river level in the 2004 dry season disrupted river traffic and sharply increased prices for a range of essential commodities including cement.

Kisangani was also a good place to launch SE*CA's first community projects and YES training in communities along the various axes radiating from the city.

For the Kisangani office, all the CFR activities began in early July. At first, the project sought popular and visible projects to draw attention to the deployment of the SE*CA program in the area. In addition, activities that revitalized business around Kisangani were welcome. Projects to rehabilitate markets and the railroad, which had been dormant for six years, were highly successful as they not only addressed needs, but exemplified SE*CA's approach and its ability to quickly mobilize resources from participating groups and obtain external funding to purchase materials to implement projects. In addition to the projects, various public infrastructure like schools were built and water points were rehabilitated. The MONUC radio station, Radio Okapi, has promoted SE*CA's activities in Kisangani and Orientale provinces. To show public support, the Vice Governor of the Orientale Province asked if he could place the first stone on the market project, a project that was even more in the spotlight with the recent visit of the president of the country, Mr. Joseph Kabila.

The second round of projects will be less visible than the first group, in part because they will be completed in less accessible zones (Buta, Isiro, Bafwasende, Ubundi) and also, because they will be smaller and more focused on reinforcing the impact of YES training, rather than on spotlighting the arrival of SE*CA.

The selection of projects that are appropriate in Ituri is challenging. The Bunia office is developing a transition program in a conflict zone. Despite the ongoing DRC program, the disarmament of militia is moving at a slow pace. Only 3000 militia out of 15,000 participated in the process. After a first phase, during which the militia plundered their own population and the resources of their territories, armed groups have entered a second phase. In this phase, the groups resume their fights for territories, which

¹⁰ An example of the need for cooperation is the completion of the Lokorto bridge just north of Bunia that represents the divide between hostile, if not warring groups.

triggers a massive movement of population and the creation of three major camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Tche, Kafe, and Gina—more than 70,000 people are estimated to have fled their homes.

Since mid-February, there has been a third phase with fighting based on ethnic differences and abductions. After the recent killing of nine UN soldiers from Bangladesh, the UN has sought to dismantle the headquarters of the FNI-Lendu militia in Loga. This has created a climate of killing and retribution against members of the international humanitarian community. The national government in Ituri has little influence on the territory, despite the nomination of new administrators over the last few months. As long as militias control main sources of revenue like customs duties for goods coming from Uganda, they will continue to be active, especially since the national government does not yet have the means or the authority to establish a more firm presence in the district.

It has been challenging to implement a community stabilization program in Ituri. The SE*CA office in Bunia has predominantly focused on dealing with instability factors in the communities and throughout its operational zones. Four main factors have been identified:

- Constant insecurity that make communities afraid of being looted.
- Ethnic hatred that prevents contact between communities.
- War affected youth that have lost social references and could become looting groups or be integrated into the militia
- Partial information that fuel rumors, hate, and false information about the transition.

The SE*CA project has focused on creating infrastructure or other projects that can bring communities together (rehabilitating bridges, holding a football tournament, or designing an educational center). Projects focused on “distribution” approaches are not considered as valuable and portable assets could endanger beneficiaries and increase their vulnerability to harassment. In regards to TAP programming, the aim was to provide quality information and foster exchanges through youth or information centers with sensitization activities

While the project originally envisaged holding YES trainings in Aru and Zumbe during the second cycle, the latter zone has become a staging ground for large concentrations of FNI militia. The project will need to identify new zones that can reasonably deliver training and related projects. This effort may cause delays in holding YES training in Zumbe.

In the original plan for SE*CA, the project had not considered establishing a third office even if Maniema had been a possible site. In the wake of findings by the design team in Kindu and Maniema provinces, however, strong sentiment arose for providing program support to Maniema.

Currently, four master trainers have been chosen to work in Maniema Province. Kailo Territory was targeted in the first cycle. Of the 40 communities in Maniema that have been chosen for the YES program, all have large populations of voluntarily disarmed ex-Mayi-Mayi soldiers (more than 60 percent of the population in many areas) ex-child soldiers, and victims of sexual violence. Maniema was the recruitment center of Mayi-Mayi soldiers in the country. Many soldiers have now come back to the

same village, where they previously committed crimes. Armed militias are still prevalent in parts of the province and the population is often subjected to banditry, killings, harassment, and sexual violence.

As the YES program becomes well known throughout a growing number of communities and the region, SE*CA has recently approved of its support to a variety of new grants. The YES program, itself, focuses on the self-development of the participants and also fosters a sense among participants that they can regain control of their lives. The provision of tools lost during the war will enable beneficiaries to work in the fields, to fish, or in the case of craftsmen, to again practice their trade. Support to small-scale agriculture, to fish farming, or to the acquisition of small livestock such as goats, pigs, or chicken, are not very expensive projects, but if done properly can do much to allow people to have responsibility for their own lives. These projects in addition to the YES training accentuate the overall impact of the activities in the Maniema Province.

C. Media /Transition, Awareness, and Participation (TAP)

At the outset, the priority was to create and/or reinforce the technical and professional media capacity to respond to an accelerating demand for information dissemination activities as the election date approached. It was also conceived as a way to leverage the impact of CFR activities beyond the zones where the project was present, by raising awareness about the successes of the YES training and the community projects and thus contributing to the overall synergy of program activities. .

Two types of activities will be addressed on a priority basis. The first activity reinforces existing communications, including media, awareness-raising NGOs, electronic communications and transition institutions. The second activity encompasses the production of contents for media and other communications vehicles including the production of easily accessible information on the transition process and promotional material on the SE*CA project and activities.

These two interventions seek to achieve several objectives:

- Undertake information, education, and communications campaigns about some of the key questions concerning the transition process;
- Facilitate access to diverse and balanced information on the transition process; and
- Track, facilitate, and make widely known the community activities of the SE*CA program through its Community Focused Reintegration (CFR) activities and the broader objectives of the SE*CA project.

SE*CA has reinforced Radio Okapi's broadcasting capability in various regions of the country, by strengthening the capacity of community radio in a number of different locations: Muanda in Bas Congo, Bandundu town, Kasongo in southern Maniema Province, Tshikapa in Western Kasai, and Kolwezi in Katanga Province.

With the visit of OTI's media specialist from Washington in October, the TAP team had refined and updated its implementation strategy and operational plan. TAP decided to largely focus on radio (FM

and shortwave) as the most effective vector by which to relay messages on the SE*CA project, the political transition, and the national elections scheduled for June 2005. Through a grant which supports a series of short-wave broadcasts, the coverage area has been significantly expanded and SE*CA's messages about the transition and the national elections are now reaching a much broader audience.

D. Baseline Study

Measuring the overall impact of the SE*CA program and its components required implementing an effective monitoring and evaluation system to provide relevant indicators for successful reintegration and baseline data that gauged program progress.

Indicators

Monitoring the activities of the various program interventions is relatively straightforward. However, monitoring and evaluating the reintegration impact of the programs is more difficult as it requires measuring changes in attitudes and relationships at the community level rather than assessing numbers and categories of beneficiaries. These include indicators that are specific to ex-combatant and community reintegration, particularly the degree to which stable, viable, rehabilitated communities have emerged, measured in terms of community confidence and stability, economic and productive recovery, and social capital.

During the start-up phase workshop, OTI and Chemonics personnel were presented with the OTI Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP), which was used as a basis for agreeing on indicators to be used in the evaluation of the project.

The first step in any such project is to know the community and its needs. SE*CA master trainings were targeted for trainings on the baseline studies in order to ensure a consistent link between the program and the monitoring and evaluation. Their observations would help to guide and support programmatic decisions as well as provide the basis for a systematic monitoring and evaluation system.

Training for the baseline study started at the end of May in Kisangani with a consultant and a group from the University of Kinshasa, whom the consultant had already used in prior evaluations in the DRC. In early June, an unfortunate security incident¹¹ resulted in massive public demonstrations that forced the consultant and other expatriate staff to evacuate to Kampala. This incident delayed the first phase of the rolling baseline by about one month. When the training restarted, eight sites were selected for the baseline study: three in the Kisangani operational zone, three in Ituri, and two in Maniema.

In July and August last year, the baseline survey was conducted in the eastern part of the country where the CFR program is being implemented. The baseline survey was carried out to mark the program's starting point for future performance and impact measurement, while at the same time serving to inform and contribute to the development of the monitoring and evaluation tools.

¹¹ See the section on "Evacuation" on page 36.

Progressively baseline studies will be made as the program enters new areas where conditions differ considerably from the present program environment.

II. CFR PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

The primary goal of the Community Focused Reintegration Program (CFR) is to ensure a stable and more secure environment for war-torn communities. The program seeks to achieve this goal by adhering to the preliminary objective: to re-socialize war-affected youth and support their reintegration into communities.

The CFR component of SE*CA seeks to bring about a change in a population's way of seeing itself, its capacities to affect change, and to help provide the means through which an individual can earn a living and positively contribute to community wellbeing. It is also designed to help people who are excluded, for whatever reason, learn or relearn how to live and actively participate in society through socially acceptable means. By assisting development initiatives at the community level via the facilitation of solutions to common problems and the provision of work and training opportunities, efforts to reintegrate war-affected people into the community can be enhanced. High-impact, labor intensive, community driven social and physical infrastructure reconstruction projects have always been high on the priority list of projects meriting SE*CA's support.

A. Community Development

Before SE*CA launches project or training activities in any community, a series of steps must be undertaken to ensure that the project or training can achieve its objectives. The first step is to appraise the state of the community before any SE*CA activity begins. Set forth on the next page are a series of visits to raise awareness with the population as to how SE*CA functions, its philosophy and objectives, and the roles the community can play to ensure its success. The visits also help create CGICs¹², a body designed to represent community interests in a broad sense also to include marginal groups CGICs are selected by vote and entrusted with the responsibility of carrying out SE*CA-supported activities in the CGIC's zone. Once the CGICs are selected, it is their responsibility to select local facilitators whose job it is to deliver the training modules to community participants in addition to the selection of a project assistant to monitor, along with the CGICs and SE*CA personnel, the advancement of community projects supported by the grants mechanism.

B. Visits

It is critical to identify an appropriate community after a thorough process of visits, discussions, questions and answers, elections, and agreements with the community. This process is important for confidence building and is accomplished over time, as one must allow space for each community to discuss and consider whether they are ready to make the commitment.

The CFR has an elaborate community entry and sensitization strategy. After a site has been selected based on its effects of war, the master trainers again visit the region to carry out mapping exercises, to determine the key communities and personalities or groups whose involvement will influence the rest of the communities and their populations. Ten communities were selected in each site in which four to five visits were made to sensitize the authorities, opinion leaders, men, women and children. In the meetings,

¹² Comité de gestion et d'intégration communautaire

the program's mandate and community's involvement and role were explained together with questions and answer sessions. This approach, which takes about one month before a memorandum of understanding is signed, contributes to SE*CA's acceptability and success in areas where humanitarian aid agencies have failed to make a significant impact.

The sensitization process officially began in mid July in Kisangani and in August for the field offices in Bunia and Kindu. During this exercise, master trainers visited communities and talked to local and opinion leaders in selected communities. After each master trainer team had selected ten communities¹³ in each of the two axes assigned to them, they began the sensitization process. The sensitization included informing the communities about SE*CA, nation unification and the transitional processes that had begun along with an invitation to actively participate in this process with SE*CA. As long as the communities agreed to collaborate with SE*CA, master trainers arranged four meetings with all community stakeholders where explanations on roles, responsibilities, question and answer sessions were held. Each meeting took between three to five hours. Three to four meetings of this nature were required before the community and SE*CA entered into a contractual working relationship. In the course of these meetings, if one party was uncomfortable with the other, negotiations were terminated.

Community visits are an ongoing activity and one of the open secrets of the impact of SE*CA. SE*CA staff continue to visit communities to support local facilitator's trainings, monitoring and evaluation, to discuss, plan and implement projects with the CGIC. It is anticipated that to enhance sustainability, the team will make fewer visits after the first cycle to encourage and support the communities about their new initiatives. These visits also serve another, less visible purpose. Many of the communities served by SE*CA are remote and often the most rudimentary means of communication with the outside world. Information regarding their needs or about the general conditions of their communities does not flow out and daily information that they need does not flow in. The presence of SE*CA staff and local facilitators serves an important psychological function by reconnecting communities severed from the life of their region and the rest of the country through regular visits. It was not common during the baseline study to find people in some of the communities who thought Mobutu was still the president of the country.

By way of illustration, the first visits for the Kisangani office started in the second week of July 2004. The purpose of those initial visits was to meet communities in which history and actual population profiles meshed with the goals of the CFR program; war-affected communities were identified through this exercise. The master trainers divided into three teams of two people, went in the fields, following the main roads out of Kisangani to identify the places where the project's activities were most needed.

These first evaluations, which were aided by the work of the baseline team, identified about 100 communities of which a certain number were retained and in which SE*CA set about deploying and initiating activities. Under the authority of the training officer, the Field Supervisor for Kisangani and

¹³ It should be understood that when mentioning 'communities' in the context of YES training, reference is to a population catchment area, as it is not always an easy matter to physically demarcate a community in regions where populations are often scattered over wide areas and community boundaries are not always formally defined.

CFR Program Manager¹⁴, several other criteria were added to the first set of selection criteria : access, security, presence of war-affected youth and minority, and lack of NGO or other groups' presence. Those criteria helped to further limit the selection of communities down to 66 in the five main axes around Kisangani, following the recommendations of the training officer and the CFR program manager. A similar approach was used in Ituri and Maniema to identify and prepare communities for the various SE*CA interventions in these zones.

C. CGICs

After four weeks of sensitization, master trainers begin to set up community committees (CGIC) which guided activities¹⁵, and acted as a link between SE*CA and other humanitarian agencies and their community. The committee, which comprises ten members, has a president, a treasurer, a secretary, three learning facilitators¹⁶, a project assistant, and three committee members all elected democratically by community members. SE*CA also required that these committees be composed equally of men and women. The committees included traditional leaders, since they are normally involved in every important decision in the communities. One of the modules, which was well received in all project zones, focuses on the reaffirmation of traditional values.

The other responsibility for a CGIC is to enter into a contractual agreement with SE*CA by signing the MOU and respecting the MOU's articles, which included the selection of YES course participants, management of training sessions, development of small community projects and conflict resolution. In principle, SE*CA expects the CGICs to represent all groups in the communities, including vulnerable groups, youths, ex-combatants, ex-child soldiers, victims of sexual violence, and others. At the end of all funded projects and activities, the MOU is clear on the procedures to be followed, including the process of handing over the project at the completion of SE*CA activities in any given community.

Following the selection of the communities, the master trainer teams returned to the communities. They meet three times with the communities before beginning election of CGICs. This means meeting with the main authorities (administrative chiefs, 'chefs coutumiers'. After this series of meetings, elections are held to elect the CGICs who in turn nominate local facilitators and project assistants to ensure that the community fulfills its mandate with SE*CA in the realization of various activities.

D. Selection of Local Facilitators and Project Assistants

The local facilitators are community volunteers selected by their communities to deliver training to youth and, at times, to those who are older than 24. The community, based on the criteria agreed upon,

¹⁴ This position was discontinued in December 2004, with functions being assumed by the Chief of Party, OTI program personnel, or by the field supervisors.

¹⁵ In part through the selection of local facilitators and project assistants who work in close collaboration with SE*CA staff in implementing various activities, the local facilitators deliver training to local participants, and project assistants monitor project implementation.

¹⁶ In the first cycle of YES training, based on the low dropout rate of local facilitators during the training cycle, the norm for the second cycle, to start in May 2005, will only include two local facilitators per community. This will keep a reduced number of reserve local facilitators, some of whom have already delivered training in the first cycle.

selects the local facilitators and the project assistants. The project assistant is charged with implementing community projects on behalf of the community. In addition to developing and delivering the training to the community participants, the local facilitators are also responsible for collecting statistical data concerning the participants, assessing the relevance, viability of the curriculum, reporting back to the master trainers, and facilitating community discussion groups about community and transition issues.

Many of the local facilitators have a teaching background. It is important that the community, through the CGIC, select reputable local facilitators who will contribute to alleviating stability in their communities. The success of the program depends in large measure on the abilities and the motivation of the local facilitators, especially in delivering the YES content. After some discussion, among SE*CA staff, it was eventually agreed that there should be a measure of motivation incentives for the local facilitators since they are asked to contribute significant amounts of time over a long period. Based on compensation of \$1.50 per three hours of training per day and given three days per week as a norm, they receive, on average, \$9 per week to deliver YES training and perform related tasks. The local facilitators are expected to train two groups of youths, 30 each per course. Thus, a team of LFs have a minimum of 60 youths to train per training cycle. At the end of their training mandate, and subject to the agreement of the CGIC, they become owners of bicycles purchased by SE*CA.

On the other hand, insufficient use was made of the project assistants during the first cycle of activities, notwithstanding an impressive scope of work. While they contributed to the conception and development of community projects, better use can be made of them in the next project cycle. In many cases, PAs, upon realizing that projects might be small or not materialize, decided to become participants in YES training in their communities. In Maniema province, the master trainers often used project assistants as reserve local facilitators.

E. Memorandum of Understanding

The MOU encompasses the basic rules about the responsibility of the community in mobilizing the participation. Rules are established for the set-up and composition of the CIGC, so that each community project that will be receiving an in-kind contribution from SE*CA does so with a written agreement between USAID/OTI, Chemonics International, and the community, through its CIGC. The program needed to officially regulate the general collaboration between the community and SE*CA with a MOU while ensuring the inclusion of women, youth, vulnerable, and excluded groups in decision-making. Liability responsibilities in case of accidents during project work and an “emergency exit” for the program in case of armed hostilities or other abnormalities make it impossible for SE*CA to deliver what has been promised.

F. Grants Activity Highlights per Region

As previously noted, grants are an essential component to the SE*CA program because they provide a process by which communities can decide and participate in the determination of their needs. Developing the project offers space and opportunity for reconciliation, reintegration of youth affected by war into community activities, and rebuilding trust.

Presently, more than \$1.48 million in grants have been obligated. The following highlights the grant status and expenditures during the reporting period:

- Project grant expenditures totaled \$872,226. The table in Annex A illustrates the status of grants to February 23, 2005.
- In total, 22 grants have been closed for a total of \$461,669.
- One grant has been completed.
- 41 grants are cleared (or ongoing) for a total of \$990,691.
- One grant has been cancelled.
- 10 grants are pending approval.

F1. Kisangani — Tshopo District

Rehabilitation of the Tshopo Municipal Market

The community of Tshopo was severely affected by the war, especially by civil unrest during the June 2000 conflict. The market, which was a central place for trade and social contact, suffered major damage to its infrastructure and deprived the surrounding inhabitants of social and



economic opportunities. The damage to the market reinforced the image of war and hostility towards the transitional government. The community had not witnessed any major positive changes since the end of war. This project was ideal because it improved commercial and economic activities in the area and offered an environment in which social activities could return to normal and

tangible benefits could visibly be seen in the community thus **Rehabilitated Tshopo Municipal Market*

reinforcing the transition process. During implementation of the project, manual laborers complained that they needed to be paid for their work. After SE*CA staff explained to them that their labor was their contribution to the project, the complaints did not stop. The market women, who were the main beneficiaries of the project, understood the message, and collected donations to feed the manual laborers realizing the importance of their contribution and what a new market could provide them. President Kabila visited the project during his first trip to eastern Congo as the Governor wanted to show him an example of positive change in Kisangani.

Rehabilitation of Student Residence at the University of Kisangani

Students are one of the youth communities in Kisangani most affected by the war. After the events of June 2004, during which students forcefully demonstrated their contempt against MONUC and international NGOs, SE*CA considered possible grants that could be developed to help recreate dialogue with the student community. After several meetings between the students and SE*CA, the attendees decided to rehabilitate one of the student residences.



** Student residence prior to rehabilitation*

By early November, the rehabilitation project (66 bedrooms, electrical circuitry, plumbing, and roofing) had been launched and it was completed by February. During the inauguration, the students declared how important the project had been in helping them understand their importance in the transition process.



** Student residence after rehabilitation*

Support to the Rehabilitation of the Railway Line Between Kisangani and Ubundu

The city of Ubundu, which lies 125 km south from Kisangani on the left bank of the Congo River, was isolated due to its lack of communication. During the wars, this city was one of the most affected because it had witnessed many armed confrontations that resulted in large numbers of dead and wounded, women who had been raped, and countless people traumatized by the violence of war and the ensuing dislocation of their community. The city and its 100,000 inhabitants had no contact with

Kisangani, no proper hospital, and ex-rebels who acted as local authorities. Due to the Kisangani office’s assistance, a project was launched to rehabilitate the train to allow transportation for humanitarian needs, re-establish a government presence, and help the population return to more secure conditions. After four months, the train took its maiden voyage in December 2004. Since that time, the governor of Orientale Province made the journey to Ubundu to re-establish government authority and administrative services for the region’s population. Since then work has begun on rehabilitation of the regional hospital and the city of Ubundu. Communities along the rail line can now begin to trade with Kisangani and the rest of the country. A sense of national belonging has now been rekindled in an entire region.

F2. Bunia – Ituri District

Lokorto Bridge Project

Community participation is a key success factor for CFR projects; this can be achieved only if communities have been properly sensitized before the project about its philosophy, objectives, and methodologies. Most of the difficulties during the rehabilitation of the Lokorto bridge resulted because the communities were former enemies and the project was designed before the communities had completed the YES first cycle. At that time, self-interest was above community interest. After a difficult start, the project has now been completed and inaugurations are planned for the middle of March. This project, like the rail line project in Kisangani, links the northern part of the district with the south. It conveys an important message that even in times of fear and mistrust, people must work together and put aside their animosities and fears to realize a common good.



** Lokorto bridge under construction*

Dele School Construction

In contrast, the Dele school project involved communities deeply affected by the war. The community contributed about 50,000 bricks to the project before signing the contract with SE*CA.



The success of the Dele School construction serves an important lesson for other activities. SE*CA's insistence on community participation before the project started was a way of assessing the community's willingness to serve communities other than their own. The community has shown its commitment to the project by providing 16 volunteers every day and large quantities of stones

**A newly constructed Dele School*

for the pavement around the school and auxiliary structures. The Dele/Lengabo communities are proud of what they consider their work; this attitude is key to securing project sustainability, maintenance, and protection. This project is also important in regards to sustainable interactions between communities in that the school is close to where the massacre in Lengabo occurred in September of last year when approximately 14 people were killed and ninety-one houses were burned. The project is a sign of the desire stabilize their communities.

Installation of Electrical Lines

Similarly, the electrification project traverses communities from Kasenyi to Tchomia along the southern banks of Lake Albert Prior to the launching of formal project activities, the communities were required to clear the path under the electricity poles before electricians came and installed the cables. This task is considerable as the project will cover approximately 100 kms and reach different ethnic communities in a region fraught with insecurities and mutual mistrust. Ultimately, the project will promote reconciliation,

trust building and understanding between communities as it requires collaboration that transcends ethnic divides.

Youth Center in Bunia

In Ituri, youth are an important factor in the district's instability because they lack opportunities and have an uncertain future. In the city of Bunia, many youth remember recent violence and harbor hatred and a spirit of vengeance towards youth of other neighborhoods and ethnic origins. One major problem is that they lack a meeting place where they can share common interests and socialize with one another. In addition, in Bunia as elsewhere, lack of jobs, and an uncertain future contribute to delinquencies. In Bunia, this delinquency too often takes the form of violence against others and feeds into the general ambiance of polarization and a continuing cycle of violence and retribution. Often, these youth gravitate towards militia groups to acquire a feeling of belonging and a sense of power that bearing arms can give.

In this troubling context, SE*CA has lent its support to a local youth organization, ADSSE, which serves as an umbrella organization for more than 20 youth associations of all ethnic affiliations and supports activities like the creation of musical groups and theatre companies. ADSSE's objective is to bring youth who would not normally fraternize with one another together to share cultural activities and to engage in the process of ethnic reconciliation and community stabilization. The director of ADSSE is sensitive to transition issues and staff at the center includes people from varying ethnic affiliations such as Hema, Lendu, Ngiti. In the future, the following activities are planned:

- Two sessions per month for the youth at the center, conducted by university professors and lawyers to explain the transition process and the mechanics of the upcoming elections.
- A bulletin board, done in partnership with the internet café in Bunia, to display important community news about the transition, the political situation in Congo, and the elections.
- Subscriptions to local and national newspapers.
- Making the center an informal information center with a radio and a listening room (a 'payotte') for quiet time and discussions.
- Weekly films on current events, about democracy and freedom, with a historical dimension, or documentaries about the Congo. The films would be followed by discussion and debate.

Information Centers in Ituri

In more remote areas of Ituri, there is a chronic lack of information. The local populations complain that they do not have sufficient access to the media to understand their present difficulties (troop movements and armed confrontations), but also the political process in their country, including elections. To increase access to and provision of information, SE*CA has created a number of information centers in different regions of the district, which are designed to become listening clubs and places where people in war-affected communities can exchange ideas. These centers will house various types of information; radio-phones, radios, televisions, tape recorders, bulletin boards, and newspapers. Local CGIs, who are supported by ADSSE, will manage the centers. ADSSE will ensure that activities continue and that the centers are functioning properly. The objective is not merely to feed information to a passive population,

but to encourage debate and reflection about issues that are important to all citizens of DRC such as the transition and the upcoming elections. In addition, these centers will provide vocational training for youth in sewing, woodworking, and other activities, thus creating economic opportunities and bringing youth together.

F3. Kindu – Maniema

The grants activities in Maniema did not begin until 2005 year due to logistical constraints at the beginning of the program. Most of the grants were community-based and focused on boosting the economic recovery of households in the project zones. SE*CA's activities in Maniema are designed to support the stabilization process in war-torn communities by providing assistance to individual households, while ensuring that the project does not discriminate by selectively giving assistance to one group at the detriment of another. Thus, while the projects are relatively numerous and small, they are also designed to improve the economic wellbeing of the entire community:

Kindu Internet Center

This grant supported the creation of an Internet center in Kindu. It financed one service provider and operating costs for the year 2005. Support to the center will help reduce the isolation of the region and give the population access to better information. If it were not for SE*CA, the Kundu community would not be able to access information and participate in the transition process at the same level as the rest of the country.

Support to Various Communities with Palm Oil Press Equipment

This project is ongoing and supports 40 targeted communities along the Lokando, Kailo, Elila-Ulindi roads, and the Congo River through the distribution of more than 80 oil presses. This project directly supports participants in the YES agricultural training module. The presses will be managed by CGIC representatives in the area. Overall, the projects will support the reconciliation process and encourage re-socialization between different groups while also providing the population with ways to improve and control their economic situation and development.

Support to Various Communities with Seeds and Tools

These ongoing projects provide seeds and farming tools to communities that have participated in YES training. The hiring and orientation of the agriculture extension agents who will supervise the agricultural improvement activity is now completed. The agents have received training and are currently training CGIC and community members to prepare seed multiplication farms. The project is 80 to 90 percent complete and has excellent community participation. The projects will benefit more than 1,500 households in the above communities and support reconciliation and economic revitalization.

Support to Various Communities with Brick Making Equipment

This ongoing project will provide about 40 communities in the Elila, Kailo, Lokando and Congo River with more than 80 brick-making machines to support community projects. This equipment is for the entire community and the machines will benefit public utilities; clinics, schools, and administrative buildings. The communal orientation of the project and ownership of the brick presses will foster a sense of community, reconciliation, acceptance and re-socialization of various societal groups.

G. Monitoring and Reporting

A comprehensive monitoring and reporting framework has been developed by OTI with contributions from Chemonics staff.

Project and training activities, such as transition awareness and community development projects and YES training, are also monitored on an ongoing basis, two times every month. Monitoring includes tracking attendance per class, male and female participation, and various quick surveys undertaken by OTI's M&E officer as the modules are being delivered.

To increase the interface between SE*CA and the communities, all 14 MTs are required to assist in tracking project implementation. They contribute, along with the PDO, in preparing bi-monthly project status reports that are placed in the database in their operating zones. Community project reports are eventually sent via the PDO to the field supervisor and then to Kinshasa.

In terms of YES training, the local facilitators and project assistants develop their activity reports and submit them to the master trainers, where they then go to the Training Officer (TO) whose responsibility is to ensure quality control and timely, concise and accurate reporting of YES activities in all project zones. Given the geographical dispersion of SE*CA YES activities, the Field Supervisors and Field Office staff assist the TO in ensuring proper and timely reporting regarding YES training activities.

III. YES PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

A. Curriculum Development

In June 2004, a consultant was hired and began to work on developing the curriculum together with the TO. A group of master trainers later joined this group to adapt and translate Youth Education and Skills (YES) curriculum from its original Sierra Leone version to Congolese. The exercise took about one month in the Kisangani field office. It is important to note that curriculum development is a continuous exercise as additional material is constantly being developed and added. At the end of March, there will be a meeting to discuss the existing curriculum and course content will be revised.

B. Training

Master Trainers (MTs)

The YES program has fourteen MTs; six in the Kisangani field office, four in Bunia, and four in Kindu. They work in teams of two, male and female. Each team of MTs facilitates trainings in 20 communities in the initial cycle, working with 20 CIGCs, training and supervising 40 LFs and 20 reserve LFs who will train 600 community participants. At the same time, they assist in the monitoring and implementation of community grants in their work zones to support training needs.

Learning Facilitators (LFs)

There are currently 410 active LFs in the program areas. Of these, 170 are based in Kisangani, 120 in Kindu, and 120 in Bunia. Each community presents two LFs for training who will then train two sets or groups of students. Each set comprises 30 students drawn from their community or one set from their community and the other from a neighboring community. The LFs will normally spend 18 hours per week training (nine hours per set of students) or three hours each day three days per week. Their involvement in the project has removed them from their daily routine and there is a need to motivate them. The success of the project will continue to depend on the ability of SE*CA to maintain a high motivation level for the facilitators in the second cycle and to ensure that they continue with the program during the duration of their training.

Community Participants

The YES participating communities are each presenting 60 participants for the training. The participants must attend all modules to graduate with a certificate. About 8,400 participants are officially in the YES training program. Each classroom is limited to 30 students, but many community members have arrived for lessons, stretching meager training materials. Actual training numbers are well above 10,000 for the current module alone. Targets for this first cycle of training included Kisangani with 3,600 participants and Kindu and Bunia with 2,400 participants each for a total of 8,400 targeted participants.

Training Cycles

There are two training cycles, A and B. Cycle A began in August 2004 and continues to April 2005. Cycle B will begin in May 2005 and will continue until November 2005. In the first cycle, each team of MTs is carrying out two LF trainings simultaneously in every module. They train 30 LFs from 10 communities, and then move immediately to another site to train 30 LFs from 10 different communities¹⁷.

Training Modules

The YES program was originally designed around seven modules, although they were combined into five modules to take into account regional conditions and time and resource constraints.

Training LFs takes four days to cover the health module, after which time they will train the community for three weeks. Then they return for training in “Generation of Revenue” for three days and teach this training to the community for two weeks. This pattern continues throughout the training cycle.

Table 1. Training Summary in Numbers

Description	BUNIA		KINDU		KISANGANI		Global	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
Total Learning facilitators	120	120	120	121	180	192	420	443
Number of groups/villages	40	32	40	42	60	65	140	146
Total Number of Participants	2400	2308	2400	2448	3600	3548	8400	7577

The above table indicates the planned, actual YES training targets based on reported modules in all field offices during this reporting period.

The first cycle of YES training was implemented in six to seven months depending on the region. The Maniema province took longer to deliver the training than Kisangani and Bunia zones because of start-up difficulties related largely to logistical and administrative considerations. Participants were required to attend three-hour lessons nine hours per week, for two or three weeks to complete one module. Each community chose different days as determined by participants plus time of assembly. Given the varying sizes of the modules, participants needed three days per week for two or three weeks to complete one module. This flexibility allowed participants time to pursue their livelihood activities. Often, though not always, sessions were conducted in the evenings or early in the morning after or before farm work depending on the community. The CGIC, together with participants, chose the training venues. There

¹⁷ However, in cycle 2, the number of LFs trained will be significantly reduced, (see note above) because no LFs have dropped out in cycle 1. Hence, there is little risk that the second cycle could be jeopardized by any lack of trained LFs to dispense YES training to community participants.

was always a central local in close proximity to the community or communities involved. During the training, participants were given writing materials (pens, notebooks, ruler, pencils and rubber). LF trainings took place at a location central to all participating communities that had the facilities to handle a residential training. Each local facilitator training drew three participants from ten participating communities, as mentioned above. During the four-day module training, the SE*CA offered meals, a copy of the module, and writing materials. In total, the entire five-modules training for LFs took 25 days from August to February 2005. Given the training's participatory approach, it was easy to keep participants focused throughout the day/week of training. Bicycles were entrusted by the CGICs to LFs to help them get around.

The official LF training languages are French, Swahili, and Lingala. At the youth's level, Kiswahili was the main language of instruction, although Lingala was used in some cases. The percentage of women to men in the LF and participants training was between 10 and 20 percent, while youth attendance was about 80 percent. Participants reported that they were proud to be associated with the movement SE*CA.

In total, there were 284 classrooms with an average of 30 participants. There were two learning lessons in each community. One-hundred and forty-six communities participated in the training (see Table 1 on page 13).

C. Implementation

The YES Program is currently implemented in the following geographical zones:

- Orientale Province, Kisangani, along axe Buta up to 160 kilometers north of Kisangani
- Axe Lubutu 80 kilometers
- Bafwasende 70 kilometers South and East of Kisangani town respectively
- Opala 80 kilometers
- Ubundu 60 kilometers west and south of Kisangani town.

These locations were selected based on the criteria developed and agreed upon by both OTI and Chemonics. The outstanding selection factor was security and relative ease of access to Kisangani to facilitate movement and transportation of materials. Even so, movement has been difficult given the poor road terrain and limited means of transport.

In Bunia, the project sites are as follows:

- Kasenyi and Tchomia East of Bunia town
- Komanda and Mambasa South of Bunia town
- Bunia town and the surrounding areas

In Kindu Maniema province, the two MT teams are deployed northward from Kindu, as follows:

- The area immediately North of Kindu town
- Kailo and adjoining areas.

In all field offices, all five YES modules have been taught. The general participants' attendance rate was over 85 percent in all operational zones. A pool of reserve LFs had been built into the design to ensure continuity in the event the original LF became ill or due to other causes. In addition, the YES training employed various strategies to ensure that youth remained motivated and to reduce the temptation to drop out. Strategies included using a participatory approach and the promise of a certificate at the end of the course. The total dropout rate is between 5 percent and 10 percent.

Table 2. YES-Training Report, March 05, 2005¹⁸.

Field offices	Health	Values	Revenue Bunia alone	Agriculture Revenue	Agriculture Bunia alone	Conflict	Democracy
Bunia	2575		2265		1200	1108	
Kisangani	3982	4054	-----	3548			
Kindu	2400		-----	2400		2448	
Total	8957	4054	2265	3548	1200	3556	

Allowing the community to appoint their own LFs is a motivating factor because it provides them a sense of responsibility and leads to a low drop out rate among LFs.¹⁹ The humanitarian aid community in DRC had been paying for all services offered by the community, including training. At the beginning of the SE*CA program, this was an issue but the training team was convinced by the youth and CGIC of its importance. In Bengamisa, a woman LF gave testimony about how she had saved her brother's life by treating him using the motivation allowance. After her brother had healed, he joined the YES training sessions. She also pointed out that she had bought a mattress and a pig for her family using the motivation money. In communities where only those who are well off eat cassava leaves cooked with salt, owning a mattress is a symbol of status.

D. Second Cycle Preparation

In January 2005, teams in all field offices conducted assessments for the second cycle sites. The assessment was conducted in advance to prepare the selected sites for the start-up of the program. As the field offices move farther out into their operational zones, the following additional operational criteria were used in the determination of areas for intervention in the second cycle: a large catchment area, access to information and news, logistics, and communication.

These criteria complement security considerations and the presence, in significant numbers, of youth affected by war-combatants, areas dominated by or with elements of militia groups, zones neglected by humanitarian aid agencies, and communities in extreme conditions, highly populated areas, and finally, agricultural/fishing communities.

¹⁸ Please note that statistics for the first cycle are incomplete for more recent modules. Information is currently being compiled and will be available in the March monthly report.

¹⁹ The financial incentive and mobility afforded by a bicycle are important factors as well.

Based on the findings, the following sites were selected and approved for second cycle CFR intervention²⁰.

- Kisangani field office: Isiro, Buta, and Bafwasende
- Bunia: Aru Ariwara and Geti/Aveba²¹
- Kindu: Punia

E. Monitoring and Reporting²²

The Training Officer monitors the work of 14 MTs, who in turn monitor the work of 460 LFs and 146 CGICs. In the first cycle of training, each team of MTs had twenty community CGICs to supervise and sixty LFs. The MTs spend two weeks training LFs, then two other weeks carrying out monitoring visits. The LFs made their reports to the MTs. Upon receiving reports from the twenty communities, they prepared their monthly report to the TO which were then copied to the field supervisor who then passed it on to Kinshasa office. At the end of the first cycle, the training team will meet to review the training process and the coursework. This will provide time for modifications in the second training cycle.

²⁰ These included both YES training modules and community activities.

²¹ This is in Zombe area, now considered unsafe. Consequently, second cycle CFR activities may now be occur around the Mahagi area.

IV. TAP AND INFORMATION PROGRAM ACTIVITIES

The media component of SE*CA has a dual mandate: 1) to provide effective, objective, and balanced information about the transition process and the planned democratic elections, and 2) to increase the visibility of the CFR component of SE*CA's activities. Through an effective communications strategy, SE*CA's impact is multiplied by making project accomplishments better known, to stimulate similar self-help initiatives elsewhere.

A. Support to the Transition Institutions and Process

A wide range of activities and initiatives have been undertaken, or are under way, to promote knowledge about and support for the transition process and the ensuing democratic elections scheduled for June 2005.

- **Strengthening of technical and professional capacity of radio stations and networks:** With SE*CA support, in partnership with "*Fondation Hironnelle*". Two community radio stations in Katanga and Bas-Congo Provinces are able to retransmit UN Radio Okapi programs and broadcast objective and varied information about the transition process. With SE*CA's support, other similar projects are in different stages of development and implementation in other parts of the DRC.
- **Capacity building for the written media:** In South Kivu, in a region particularly hard hit by the Great Lakes crisis, SE*CA's support to a local newspaper, "*Le Souverain*," has significantly contributed to reducing tensions, to halting wild rumors, and to partisan manipulation of the transition process, in favor of more solid, documented information on the political transition and the elections.
- **Developing journalists' professional skills:** To address issues raised by the crisis shaking eastern DRC, a workshop on the media's handling of the South Kivu crisis was proposed for journalists in Bukavu and surrounding regions. At the end of the workshop, the journalists decided to support the SE*CA project and the transition process by providing ongoing information about SE*CA, and through sensitization campaigns for local populations.
- **Reinforcement of electronic communications vector:** Rehabilitation of the Internet centre for South Kivu (which was destroyed during the attacks of General Laurent Nkunda and Colonel Jules Mutebusi in May to June of this year) will re-establish various sensitization campaigns about the theme of peace and the democratic process. Opening an Internet centre in Aru (Ituri District of Orientale Province) will help reduce the isolation of the region and allow access to better information to a population particularly cut off from such access.
- **Production of media material**
 - o Written media – Support to "*Dialogue National*," an information bulletin focusing on peace education whose circulation targets a more informed population, government

administrators, politicians, opinion leaders, and NGO workers. Twice weekly circulation will be multiplied tenfold from the present 250 per issue to 2,500. This will allow an increase in news and developments about the issues and debates that accompany the transition process and democratic elections.

- o Radio messages – There is a campaign currently being developed to broadcast peace messages in all four national languages of the DRC throughout the country. The messages will inform people about the democratic process.
- o Support to the “*Commission Electorale Indépendante*” (CEI) – The law that serves as a framework for the electoral rules for the democratic elections has been translated into the four national languages, and will be widely distributed throughout the country. It will support various sensitization campaigns that will be implemented up to election day.
- o Special activities – A series of cultural events were undertaken for International Peace Day (September 21), including a play, concert, and poetry readings, all of which received broad media coverage. The events, held in Kisangani, Bunia and Kisangani, offered an opportunity to spread the word about the transition, the democratic process, and SE*CA project objectives of bringing peace to the DRC through a variety of community-based activities.



*International Peace Day concert in Bunia, Ituri promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation.

o A successful concert was held in Bunia, with music, speeches and various personalities promoting inter-ethnic reconciliation. This activity was a resounding success as it brought together people from all parts of the city who until that time had stayed away due to

mistrust and fear. It also made SE*CA programming activities better known in Ituri District.

- o At the same time, and with the same theme for International Peace Day, various cultural and sporting events were organized in Kisangani, to promote the themes of peace, to bring people together, and to make the SE*CA program more visible in the Kisangani area. A number of important personalities were invited, including the governor of Orientale Province, representatives of the city administration, the government of DRC, traditional chiefs, UN agencies, international and local NGOs, and members of civil society.

B. Support to SE*CA Program Activities in Eastern DRC

In addition to informing the population, decision makers, and opinion leaders about the transition process and the democratic elections, the media program is actively developing its mandate to increase the visibility of the SE*CA project, its philosophy, goal, objectives, and activities. This leverages the interventions of the YES and community grants elements of SE*CA by making these activities more widely known and by serving as examples of community reintegration, thus encouraging similar initiatives by other groups. Current activities include the following:

- Production of content for written media: The publication of the SE*CA newsletter “SE*CA Info” is presently underway. It highlights and explains CFR activities of the SE*CA project.
- In Ituri, which has widespread militia activity and population movement, information is critical for helping local populations understand events that adversely affect their daily lives (such as shooting, movements of troops or populations, looting, retaliation) as well as what is at stake for the future (political decision, DDR progress, transition and elections).
- Broadcasting Radio Okapi on short wave, which is scheduled to begin in early March, will give isolated communities unbiased information, counteracting the influence of Ugandan senders in the region.
- Projects like the Internet center in Aru create enthusiasm in the population that is thirsty for information and frees the way to uncensored media.
- The cultural center of Bunia, in partnership with ADSSE,²³ is a hit among youth that have no other leisure activity or a place to meet. The concept also interests other donors and local authorities. This enthusiasm could maximize the project’s impact in the district.

- Information centers, coupled with sensitization project and educational centers in remote areas, will help fuel discussion within communities, and broaden the access and interest in information to all population groups (women attending sewing lessons or youth in carpenter workshops).

V. ADMINISTRATION

A. Recruitment

The GO team arrived in country at the end of February 2004 and long-term staff arrived within 30 days after the contract had been signed. Long-term expatriate staff came from other Chemonics projects, were recruited externally, or worked for subcontractors such as Internews.

Many personnel changes occurred during the period: the CFR and TAP Manager positions were eliminated due to budget restrictions and re-orientation of the program. Among the local staff, the Information Technology (IT) specialist was replaced and the Administrative Assistant position was merged with the Executive Secretary. In Kisangani, the Procurement Specialist and Bookkeeper did not pass their probation period, nor did the Office Manager in Bunia.

Newly hired staff included a Procurement Specialist/Logistician as well as an Accountant in Kinshasa. A security guard in Bunia was promoted to Procurement Specialist. During the second year of the project, staff changes will continue as the program evolves and staffing adjustments are made.

Six-month evaluations occurred and a salary scale was implemented that lead to significant salary increases for most local staff. At the one-year anniversary of the project, contract extensions and annual evaluations will take place and additional staffing adjustments will be considered.

B. Training

Given the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the project, as well as the challenges inherent in working in DRC, a number of trainings are necessary. Some training will focus on issues specific to various project components or to administrative, financial issues, information technology, among others. Other training will give senior staff in the Kinshasa or the field offices a more holistic view of the program allowing them to view their work within a broader context. Such training is particularly important for those who work directly with communities and will enable staff to help communities understand how project objectives and approaches are designed to reinforce each other and yield a greater impact.

C. All Staff Training

All staff training is conducted every 3-4 months and gives all SE*CA staff throughout all field offices an opportunity to meet and focus on team building and discuss project activities, such as the grants cycles, and any problems they may have encountered developing work plans and other activities. Three all-staff trainings have been held since the beginning of the project. Participants have usually included OTI staff from the Kinshasa office²⁴ and all non-support staff from SE*CA's three offices. The senior managers, as well as the Grants and Office Managers, Procurement Manager and Specialist, the IT specialist, the

²⁴ Staff from OTI and Chemonics headquarters in Washington, D.C. have also attended several of these trainings.

Head Accountant, and Expeditor, as well as the field supervisors, MTs, the TO, and the project development officers participated in the trainings.

D. Procurement and Logistics

The procurement and logistics department is responsible for hiring a Procurement/Logistics Specialist. In addition to procurement, this person will coordinate shipping project material to the project sites. The procurement team consists of a procurement manager in Kinshasa, a logistician as well as procurement specialists in Kisangani and Bunia who complete local procurement requests.

The project has VHF communication systems, HF Codans, satellite phones, and VSAT Internet connections in Kinshasa, Kisangani, and Bunia.

VI. FINANCE²⁵

A. Budget and Expenditures

SWIFT II Contract number DOT-I-00-03-00005-00 was awarded on February 23, 2004 for a total contract amount of \$15,185,577. Thus far, \$5.1 million has been obligated to this project and \$4.5 million has been spent. The table below shows the status of project expenditures up to January 31, 2005.

Table 5

Line Items	Budget	Expenses to 1/31/05	Remaining Funds	Percent Remaining
Salaries	1,636,799	701,198	935,601	57.16%
Direct Fringe	207,060	40,339	166,721	80.52%
Indirect Fringe	303,964	150,070	153,894	50.63%
Overhead	1,176,243	489,721	686,522	58.37%
Travel and Transportation	1,275,760	524,866	750,894	58.86%
Allowances	924,918	334,513	590,405	63.83%
Other Direct Costs	1,000,743	425,076	575,667	57.52%
Equipment Vehicles and Freight	542,494	442,851	99,643	18.37%
Training	0	109,534	-109,534	0.00%
Grant Programs	6,374,724	833,010	5,541,714	86.93%
Subcontracts and Consultants	582,509	108,821	473,688	81.32%
Subtotal	14,025,214	4,159,999	9,865,215	70.34%
General and Administrative	561,008	133,086	427,922	76.28%
Subtotal	14,586,222	4,293,085	10,293,137	70.57%
Fixed Fee	471,861	198,965	272,896	57.83%
Grants Fee	127,494	16,660	110,834	86.93%
TOTAL	15,185,577	4,508,710	10,676,867	70.31%

* Home Office Invoice for February 2005 was not available at the writing of this report.

VII. SECURITY

A. Evacuation

In late May and early June 2004, a number of officers from the FARDC led a rebellion against the central government. The ensuing disorder and military confrontation resulted in a number of casualties in Bukavu and elsewhere in the region, destruction of property, and a significant rise in tensions and anti-Rwandan sentiment throughout the country. The trouble during this period was attributed largely to actions of the Rwandan government that caused a series of broad-based public demonstrations in the major cities of the DRC, including Kinshasa and Kisangani. Certain sectors of the population became xenophobic during the demonstrations and led to the evacuation of a number of expatriate staff and one consultant from Kisangani, one of the cities most widely affected by the problems. A total of four expatriate staff members²⁷ and one consultant on a SE*CA contract had to be airlifted to Kampala.

The situation in Kisangani was tense throughout June 2nd. The population was targeting and attacking UN and MONUC buildings, vehicles, and personnel in town. A number of our staff witnessed the ransacking of the OCHA office around the corner from the SE*CA offices. Several expatriate staff was sequestered in a restaurant close to the OCHA office while crowds burned and looted the OCHA office. It was only due to the intervention of the local police and army that the crowd dispersed but the building was burned down along with vehicles and motorcycles in the compound. At least one international NGO office was attacked, burned, and looted, and the SE*CA office, just a week after the inauguration of the project in the city, was also attacked suffering some light damages and loss of some inventory including a number of motorcycles. A few blocks away the mob attacked and looted the MONUC hotel where six SE*CA MTs were staying. Most of them lost everything except for the clothes that they were wearing.

The expatriate staff returned to their posts in Kisangani and Kinshasa within the week; the consultant returned home, and the activities relating to a baseline for which she had been contracted were rescheduled to the following month. The MTs who had assumed losses returned home, some to Maniema, others to Ituri District.

One important consequence of the demonstrations and evacuation from Kisangani was the delay in certain program activities, notably the launching of YES training for the MTs and the completion of the first phase of the baseline study. For these activities, up to a month of time was lost and the troubles caused delays in the arrival of the media consultant and implementation of field activities with communities in the program's operational zones. Subsequently after these events, a revised evacuation plan was created based on the lessons learned.

²⁶ See 'Situation in Ituri' and 'evacuation plans' in following sections.

²⁷ The field supervisor for Kisangani, the program and finance managers, and the training officer.

B. Situation in Ituri

Fighting continues and is intensifying in Ituri, an area that has remained outside the ongoing political transition that began in DRC in December 2002. Violence and human rights abuses in Ituri District will not end until the government is more firmly established. A visible sign of the return of a centralized authority is the gradual deployment of the Ituri Brigade of the FARDC, which is performing well and contributing to a reduction of inter-ethnic conflict and general disorder resulting from the activities of militias or armed groups.

Besides restoring order by deploying the Ituri Brigade, the national government has also been trying a softer method through discussion and compromise with the armed groups now holding much of the district hostage. This initiative has led to the dissolution of the interim administration in Ituri and the naming of a district commissioner, two deputies, and administrators for each of the five constituent territories of the district.

The competition in Ituri for the control of natural resources by combatant forces has been exacerbated by a nearly constant political vacuum in the region. This has been a major factor in prolonging the crisis. The SE*CA program, through its various activities, is supporting the transitional government and efforts of the international community, to ensure that full state authority is restored in Ituri, which has been the scene of inter-militia fighting since 1998. Certain issues need to be addressed to ensure faster restoration of peace and stability in the region. These include land reform; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, rebuilding public infrastructure; information campaigns to create transition awareness and encourage the return of communities to their places of origin; and restoration of local conflict management initiatives with the aim of rebuilding trust and reconciliation. The SE*CA program is addressing some of these issues in its CFR and TAP activities.



The peace process has also meant that some armed groups, notably the UPC/L and the FAPC have been accredited as political parties by Kinshasa, while other groups have been seeking to achieve similar recognition.

Progress has been made in re-establishing the presence of the national administration by nominating judges and other members of the judicial system at the District Court of Bunia and transferring to Kinshasa and Kisangani a number of detainees

* Recent Internally Displaced Camp - Ituri

considered too dangerous to be left in the district. At the same time, a number of regional warlords have been elevated to the rank of general of brigade groups in the FARDC, even as the government has deployed two police battalions in Bunia town.

Central authority has yet to be firmly established in Ituri, which is attributed to the fact that armed groups still control certain important economic regions of the district like Mongbwalu and Djalasiga and generate considerable revenues from duties, taxes and other levies on local populations, traders, and merchants, as in Aru, Mahagi, Kasenyi, Tchomia, even in the Bunia central market.

While the government attempts to reestablish its presence in Ituri, MONUC, which is generally seen by the general population as ineffectual, has been strengthening its presence and coming under increasing pressure to fully exercise its mandate under the UN Charter. This mandate allows it to use force when necessary to ensure respect for various resolutions taken on the DRC by the international community. The recent events resulting in the death of a number of Bangladeshi military and a consequent reprisal killing of both militia members and civilian populations has increased tension, insecurity, and put at risk expatriate workers in the district. The MONUC contingent has been reinforced by the recent arrival of additional troops from Morocco and the Republic of South Africa, with a concomitant reinforcement of MONUC presence in Ituri. Nonetheless, the UN force is still regarded with disdain or hostility by the general population.

Recently, there has been a significant rise in violence in the regions around Mahagi and in Djugu region. In the wake of this renewed fighting, particularly in Djugu, the Minister of Defense of the Transition Government, accompanied by a large delegation including the military advisor to the president of the country, the commander of the ground of the FARDC, the commander of the 9th. Military region and the Governor of Orientale Province, with the following outcomes:

- A decision to deploy the FARDC in Aru and in Mahagi
- Warnings from the Minister of Defense to the leaders of the Lendu community
- The arrest, in Kinshasa, of the president of the FNI²⁹ and of two commanders of the FNI-FRPI, recently promoted to the rank of generals of brigade groups.
- A decision to send additional FARDC troops under the commander of the brigade commander.

Elsewhere in the district, according to MONUC, there was large-scale systematic looting and stealing by the militias and the national integrated soldiers and Mayi-Mayi following the fighting in Kanyabayonga from December 12 to 15, 2004. The armed forces that were responsible for protecting the civilians turned against them. This resulted in large-scale internal displacements as some sought refuge in neighboring Uganda. Since the signing of a global peace accord on December 27, 2003 in

²⁹ Front Nationaliste Intégrationiste, a Lendu militia / political movement

South Africa³⁰, all former formally recognized rebel movements joined the transitional government. Each party kept their own militiamen on standby for future integration into the national army.

In light of increasing disorder, insecurity and violence in various parts of Ituri, SE*CA has given high priority to updating regional evacuation plans. A model of the Ituri plan, on which other plans are being developed, is included in the following section. YES trainings for the second cycle that are planned for the beginning of May are included in the revision. The Ituri plan is already in place while plans for the other two field offices, in Kisangani and Kindu, are currently being reviewed and should be in place before the end of March 2005.

³⁰ The Lusaka, Sun City, and Dar es Salaam accords seek to reintegrate some of the Congolese, who had taken up arms, into a new national army; however, the possibilities for re-integration are limited because of the number of youth that have joined various armed groups.

APPENDIX A AND APPENDIX B**SE*CA GRANTS EXPENSES SUMMARY TO February 21, 2005**

Office	Grant Code	Grant Name	Grant Budget	Previous total expenses	Current Month	Total expenses to date	Remaining Expenses	Perce Sper
Bunia	ARUM001	Opening of an internet center in Aru	57,496	45,680	0	45,680	11,816	79%
Kisangani	BABG005	School Rehabilitation in Babombilo	58,179	57,579	600	58,179	0	100%
Kisangani	BAFG004	Rehabilitation of 7 water points	24,047	12,743	300	13,043	11,004	54%
Kisangani	BAYG001	School Rehabilitation in Bayanguma	58,117	55,258	600	55,858	2,259	96%
Bunia	BUDG002	Restauration of electricity between Budana and Tchomia (Ituri)	102,070	79,833	4,950	84,783	17,287	83%
Bunia	BUNG004	Dele School Rehabilitation	55,005	33,960	6,399	40,359	14,647	73%
Bunia	BUNM005	Inter-ethnic Youth Cultural and Athletics center	24,426	1,117	0	1,117	23,309	5%
Bunia	BUNM006	International Peace Day events in Bunia	3,344	3,306	0	3,306	38	99%
Bunia	BUNG007	Ituri Bridge Rehabilitation	17,288	1,339	0	1,339	15,949	8%
Bunia	BUNG008	Motivation support to YES learning facilitators	19,620	0	0	0	19,620	0%
Kisangani	KABG002	Restauration of electricity for 82,000 people in Kabondo	38,349	38,349	0	38,349	0	100%
Kindu	KIDG001	Motivation support to YES learning facilitators	13,671	0	0	0	13,671	0%
Kindu	KIDG002	Seeds and Tools for 292 households in LUBELENGE	10,068	0	0	0	10,068	0%
Kindu	KIDG003	Seeds and Tools for 243 households in MISENGE	8,800	0	0	0	8,800	0%
Kindu	KIDG004	Seeds and Tools for 209 households in MALELA &AMBWE	7,884	0	0	0	7,884	0%
Kindu	KIDG005	Seeds and Tools for 320 households in LOKANDO	10,740	0	0	0	10,740	0%
Kindu	KIDG006	17 brick machines for 10 communities in Maniema	2,500	0	0	0	2,500	0%
Kindu	KIDG007	19 brick machines for 10 communities on the ELILA road in Maniema	2,700	0	0	0	2,700	0%
Kindu	KIDG008	Seeds and Tool kits for 263 households in KAPINDA & KIBANGALA	9,280	0	0	0	9,280	0%

Office	Grant Code	Grant Name	Grant Budget	Previous total expenses	Current Month	Total expenses to date	Remaining Expenses	
Kindu	KIDG009	29 brick machines for 10 communities in the KAILO area of Maniema	3,700	0	0	0	3,700	0%
Kindu	KIDG010	19 brick machines for 10 communities in the LOKANDO aera	3,260	0	0	0	3,260	0%
Kinshasa	KINM001	Support to the broadcast of MONI MAMBU radio series	33,390	15,720	1,106	16,826	16,564	50%
Kinshasa	KINM002	Support to the information and Peace Bulletin	17,660	15,721	840	16,561	1,099	94%
Kinshasa	KINM005	Support to Community Radio Libre in Kolwezi	55,201	9,175	0	9,175	46,026	17%
Kinshasa	KINM007	Support to Community Radio Muanda	45,917	9,175	0	9,175	36,742	20%
Kinshasa	KINM008	Peace Motto	16,925	15,110	0	15,110	1,815	89%
Kinshasa	KINM009	Support to Le Souverain Newspaper	17,070	13,708	0	13,708	3,362	80%
Kinshasa	KINM010	Support to bi-monthly SECA Infos	15,121	3,862	1,800	5,662	9,459	37%
Kinshasa	KINM011	Printing and Dissemination of the law on the IEC	25,551	18,504	0	18,504	7,047	72%
Kinshasa	KINM013	Rehabilitation of the Peace Information Center in Cimpunda	6,625	5,593	0	5,593	1,032	84%
Kinshasa	KINM014	SECA Visibility Materiel (Part 1)	28,250	19,693	0	19,693	8,557	70%
Kinshasa	KINM015	SECA Visibility Materiel (Part 2)	2,500	1,422	0	1,422	1,078	57%
Kinshasa	KINM016	SECA Visibility Materiel (Part 3)	18,875	18,205	0	18,205	670	96%
Kinshasa	KINM019	Identification of Radio Okapi Partner Radios	6,732	6,601	0	6,601	131	98%
Kinshasa	KINM020	Workshop on Crisis Management Using Media in South Kivu	17,084	14,010	0	14,010	3,074	82%
Kinshasa	KINM022	Cultural Peace Day	2,760	2,510	0	2,510	250	91%
Kinshasa	KINM023	Peace Sensitization of Congolese Population using SMS	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Kinshasa	KINM024	Peace Sensitization of Congolese Population using SMS	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Kinshasa	KINM025	Support to FH/Radio Okapi Partner Radio "Concorde Nationale"	58,780	9,175	0	9,175	49,605	16%
Kinshasa	KINM026	Support to FH/Radio Okapi Partner Radio "Sauti ya Mkaaji"	57,292	9,175	0	9,175	48,117	16%
Kinshasa	KINM027	Support to FH/Radio Okapi Partner Radio "Kilimandjaro Tele Contact"	56,802	9,175	0	9,175	47,627	16%
Kinshasa	KINM028	Civic Education Video on Transition	20,000	5,600	5,600	11,200	8,800	56%

Office	Grant Code	Grant Name	Grant Budget	Previous total expenses	Current Month	Total expenses to date	Remaining Expenses	Percent Spent
Kisangani	KISG007	Support the rehabilitation of the railway between Kisangani and Ubundu	47,864	47,744	0	47,744	120	100%
Kisangani	KISG008	Supply of Bicycles for YES Learning Facilitators	48,000	29,875	0	29,875	18,125	62%
Kisangani	KISG009	Rehabilitation of the Student Residence at the University of Kisangani	68,978	56,293	3,850	60,143	8,835	87%
Kisangani	KISG011	Support the rehabilitation of the railway between Kisangani and Ubundu (2)	34,677	34,496	0	34,496	181	99%
Kisangani	KISM010	Campaign for sensitization on elections	16,256	6,777	3,659	10,436	5,820	64%
Kisangani	KISM012	International Peace Day events in Kisangani	4,280	4,141	0	4,141	139	97%
Kisangani	KISG013	Motivation support to YES learning facilitators	21,978	0	9,132	9,132	12,846	42%
Kisangani	KISM014	Kindu Internet Center Support	3,450	3,450	0	3,450	0	100%
Kisangani	KISG015	22 Palm Oil Presses for 10 community Palm Oil Businesses in Lokando	4,140	0	0	0	4,140	0%
Kisangani	KISG016	18 Palm Oil Presses for 10 community Palm Oil Businesses in Lotangi area	3,660	0	0	0	3,660	0%
Kisangani	KISG017	30 Palm Oil Presses for 10 community Palm Oil Businesses in Kailo area	5,100	0	0	0	5,100	0%
Kisangani	KISG018	21 Palm Oil Presses for 10 community Palm Oil Businesses in Elila-Ulindi	4,020	0	0	0	4,020	0%
Kisangani	KISG019	Seeds and Tools for BABONGENE Community	6,930	0	0	0	6,930	0%
Kisangani	KISG020	Seeds and Tools for YATANGE Community	6,930	0	0	0	6,930	0%
Kisangani	KISG021	Seeds and Tool kits for 10 communities in WANIE-RUKULA territory	15,215	0	0	0	15,215	0%
Kisangani	KISG022	Seeds and Tools projects along the Kisangani-UBUNDU road	6,930	0	0	0	6,930	0%
Kisangani	KISG023	Seeds and Tools projects in BANALIA territory (BUTA I axis)	7,634	0	0	0	7,634	0%
Kisangani	KISG024	Seeds and Tools projects in BANALIA territory (BUTA II axis)	9,648	0	0	0	9,648	0%
Kisangani	KISG025	3 water point projects for BALIAMBI, BABONGULI, BAKILO	9,129	0	0	0	9,129	0%
Kisangani	KISG026	5 water point projects in 4 communities on the Kisangani-LUBUTU road	15,215	0	0	0	15,215	0%

Office	Grant Code	Grant Name	Grant Budget	Previous total expenses	Current Month	Total expenses to date	Remaining Expenses	Percent Spent
Bunia	LOKG003	Rehabilitation of the Lokorto Bridge	82,982	68,547	5,040	73,587	9,395	89%
Kisangani	TSHG006	Rehabilitation of the market on the 15th avenue in the Commune of Tshopo	58,875	43,779	0	43,779	15,096	74%
Kisangani	WAGG003	Relaunching of tourist activities at the Wagenia fishing area	Cancelled	150	0	150	0	0%
		TOTAL	1,514,970	826,550	43,876	870,426	644,694	57%

USAID SE*CA Program Grants by Chemonics

Grant No. Status	Grantee Intermediary	Grant Title	Province	Clear Date	Start Date	End Date	Est. Grant Amount
ARUM001 Cleared	ADECO-ORIENTALE ONGD/asbl Chemonics	Opening of Internet Information center in ARU	Orientale	06/07/04	23/07/04	18/02/05	\$57496
BABG005 Closed	The Community of BABOMBILO II Chemonics	School rehabilitation in BABOMBILO	Orientale	29/06/04	09/07/04	31/01/05	\$58179
BAFG004 Cleared	The Community of BAFWASENDE Chemonics	Rehabilitation of 7 water points	Orientale	29/06/04	09/07/04	31/03/05	\$24047
BAYGO01 Closed	BAYANGUMA Community Village Chemonics	BAYANGUMA Primary School Rehabilitation	Orientale	09/06/04	09/07/04	31/01/05	\$5858
BUDG002 Cleared	Communities of Budana, Dele, Bogoro, Kasenyi and Tchomia-OKIMO Chemonics	Restauration of electricity between Budana, Tchomia (Ituri)	Orientale	06/07/04	19/07/04	09/05/05	\$111084
BUNG004 Cleared	Dele Community Chemonics	Dele School Rehabilitation	Orientale	31/08/04	06/09/04	24/03/05	\$57857
BUNG007 Cleared	BAKPULU and BASILI Communities Chemonics	Ituri Bridge Rehabilitation	Orientale	30/09/04	14/10/04	15/11/04	\$17288
BUNG008 Cleared	Komanda, Bunia, and Kaseyni-Tschomia Communities Chemonics	Support to YES Learning Facilitators	Orientale	21/12/04	02/08/04	31/03/05	\$19620
BUNG009 Pending	Kasenyi Community (45 Km, East of Bunia) Chemonics	Vocational Training and Information Center in Kasenyi	Orientale		21/02/05	23/05/05	\$24055
BUNG010 Pending	Tchomia Community (52 Km, East of Bunia) Chemonics	Vocational training and information center in Tchomia	Orientale		21/02/05	23/05/05	\$18611
BUNG011 Pending	Komanda Community (75 Km, west of Bunia) Chemonics	Vocational training and information center in Komanda	Orientale		21/02/05	23/05/05	\$22611
BUNG012 Pending	Kotonie community, East of Bunia, DRC Chemonics	Extension Project of the Electrical high-tension line to Kotonie	Orientale		21/02/05	23/05/05	\$34935
BUNG013 Pending	Communautés de IDOHU Chemonics	Appui à la relance des activités agricoles à Idohu	Orientale		08/03/05	03/05/05	\$4270
BUNG014 Pending	Communautés de KOMANDA Chemonics	Appui à la relance des activités agricoles à Komanda (75Km Ouest Bunia)	Orientale		08/03/05	03/05/05	\$8540
BUNGO15 Pending	Communautés de LOLWA Chemonics	Appui à la relance des activités agricoles à Lolwa (118Km de Bunia)	Orientale		08/03/05	03/05/05	\$5000
BUNGO16 Pending	Communautés de MARABO Chemonics	Appui à la relance des activités agricoles à Marabo (45Km de Bunia)	Orientale		09/03/05	03/05/05	\$4 270
BUNGO 17 Pending	Communauté de LOLWA Chemonics	Appui en décortiqueuse à paddy à Lolwa (118 Km à l'ouest de Bunia)	Orientale		09/03/05	04/05/05	\$3396

APPENDIX C

Evaluation Implementation Plan

Baseline

- Questionnaire for the baseline will remain as is.
- There will not be a need for the baseline to be conducted in every single village we work in. Chemonics – Kinshasa will follow up with a baseline Consultant regarding the appropriate number of villages in order to ensure valid statistical integrity.
- At the beginning of every new YES training cycle, the Master Trainers will conduct a series of baselines per region.
- Someone will be responsible for entering this information into the baseline database. The Field Supervisor is responsible for designating someone for this task.

Baseline and the Final Evaluation

- Most of the indicators from the baseline report can be utilized as predictive indicators for the impact of this project. Both OTI and Chemonics are in agreement with this decision.
- Chemonics is responsible for the final evaluation.
- A listing of indicators to be utilized in the final evaluation is located in sub-Appendix 1.
- It is agreed that the baseline must be compared to a control group. This control group consists of communities which did not have SE*CA interventions.
- The final evaluation will be conducted in January 2006. The information gathering will be the responsibility of the Master Trainers and Field Supervisors.
- The analysis of data and elaboration of a final evaluation report will be the responsibility of the CFR Program Manager.

Grants Evaluation

- OTI is currently developing questions for this evaluation.
- The PDO in each field office is responsible for this evaluation and the information entering into the OTI grants database upon closure of the grant.

YES Evaluation

- YES modules will be evaluated during the training cycles and the YES program in its totality at the end of every cycle.
- The questionnaire to be utilized is based upon that appearing in sub-Appendix 2.
- The information from the questionnaire needs to be accumulated the first day of training and the last day. It is understood that this will not be possible for the first cycle of training but should be done in the second.

- The Master Trainers and the Training Officer will be responsible for this task.

Mid-Project Evaluation (1 year)

- Evaluation of all grants to date. OTI will be responsible for this task while utilizing information from the grants database.
- Consolidation of YES training evaluations to date. Master Trainers and the Training Officer will be responsible for this task.
- •The same questionnaire utilized in the YES evaluation will be utilized in focus groups with persons who had not participated in the training. The Training Officer in collaboration with the CFR Manager and OTI is responsible for the identification of the villages while the Master Trainers are responsible for the questionnaire and accumulation of data results.
- If the mid-evaluation is completed after April 2005, Bunia will also be able to visit villages that have already completed their training cycle (1st cycle). There should be four months since the completion of the training.
- The Training Officer will be responsible for identifying the villages for this second evaluation in the Bunia area. The Master Trainers will be responsible for the questionnaire and accumulation of data results. The Training Officer and the CFR Program Manager are responsible for the analysis of this data.

Sub-Appendix 1

Baseline Indicators

Decreased isolation (Kindu and Kisangani):

- Improved road / bridge conditions over the next two years.
- Increased number of transportation-related IGPs.

Could be utilized for all zones and as part of the mid and final evaluation would contribute to the Goal.

Internal cohesion (all communities)

- Increased trust level
- Increased group consensus on social acceptance
- Decreased number of groups citing community rejection

This would contribute to Objective 1 of the PMP.

Education (all communities)

- Increased school attendance.

Not certain as to whether this contributes to at all to the goal and objectives of the PMP. Even our ability to address such an issue is suspect.

Access to information and awareness and discussion of national issues (all communities)

- Access to local radio stations.

- Level of discussion of national issues
 - at home
 - informal
 - formal (organized)
- Awareness of national issues among women

Contributes to Objective 2 but not certain as to whether or not we can contribute an overall increase to OTI programming.

Security issues (all communities)

- Decreased number of groups citing security concerns

Contributes to the goal but again can this be attributed to programming or can it even be used as a predictive indicator.

Stability (all communities)

- General self-assessment on economic, political and social stability in two years.
- Change over past two years

Contributes to overall goal and objective 1

Sub-Appendix 2

YES Training Evaluation Questionnaire

NB : This is used before and after the YES training cycle.

Pensez vous que des ex-combattants qui veulent adhérer a votre communauté peuvent le faire ?
(Question a poser uniquement aux personnes ne participants pas a la formation)

- a) Oui, cela ne me gênerait pas. [] 1
- b) Je suis indifférent à cette question. [] 2
- c) Non, je pense qu'ils doivent rester en dehors de la société [] 3
- d) Leur retour m'inquiéterait, mais je pense que je pourrais les accepter [] 4

Pensez que les informations sur les questions clefs de la transition sont importantes dans vie professionnelle ou dans votre vie quotidienne ?

- a) Oui, je les utilise souvent. [] 1
- b) Oui, je les utilise quelques fois [] 2
- c) Non, je n'en ai pas besoin [] 3

Avez-vous l'intention de vous établir dans cette communauté pour longtemps ?

- a) Oui . [] 1
- b) Peut être [] 2
- c) Non [] 3
- d) Je ne sais pas encore [] 4

Etes vous un membre actif de votre communauté ? Si oui, quelle est votre occupation ?

Sur La transition, pensez vous que : (indiquez le nombre des participants du groupe)

- a) Je suis optimiste . [] 1
- b) Je suis optimiste, mais je pense que son issue reste incertaine [] 2
- c) Je pense que cela ne marchera pas [] 3
- d) Je n’y pense pas du tout [] 4

(Réservez au Bureau de Bunia après le commencement du plan de RDC)

a. Combien de personnes ici ont participe au plan de désarmement de l’Ituri ou au plan national de désarmement (DDR) : (Exigez des répondants une carte de DDR)

(Réservez au Bureaux de Kindu et Kisangani après le commencement du plan national de DDR)

b. Combien de personnes ici ont participe au plan de national de désarmement (DDR)
